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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Anne K. Wilson and her husband sued Vermont 
Castings, Inc. (Vermont Castings) and others after she was 
seriously burned and disfigured while operating a Vermont 
Castings woodburning stove. After a jury trial based on 
strict products liability, the jury returned a verdict for 
Vermont Castings. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial 
claiming (1) the jurors were exposed to extraneous 
information that prejudiced Wilson, and (2) Vermont 
Castings improperly argued that she was negligent in 
operating the stove. The district court denied her motion 
and Wilson now appeals. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Anne Wilson owned a woodburning stove manufactured 
by Vermont Castings. While using this stove on November 
16, 1991, Wilson left a side door on the stove open to help 
get the fire started. As she stood in front of the stove to 
warm herself, her dress caught on fire, resulting in serious 
burns and the loss of her fingers on her left hand. 
 
Wilson sued Vermont Castings,1 claiming it was strictly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Wilson also sued Pacificorp, a west coast utility company, and VCI 
Acquisition Co. VCI was dismissed as a party defendant pursuant to 
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liable for her injuries. She claimed the stove was defective 
because (1) users had to keep the door slightly ajar to keep 
the fire going, and (2) there was no warning on the stove to 
tell users to keep the door shut. Before trial, Vermont 
Castings moved in limine to exclude any evidence of the 
existence or contents of the stove owner's manual. The 
district court granted the motion on the ground that Wilson 
had never read or seen the manual. 
 
During the trial, Wilson's counsel examined Wilson on 
the events leading up to her being burned. The evidence 
elicited on direct examination was that she started a fire 
while leaving the door open, that she stood with her back 
to the stove to warm her back, and that her left leg was 
either touching the stove apron or was relatively close to 
the apron. She testified that her dress was six to eight 
inches below her knee. After a minute or two in this 
position, she noticed her dress was on fire. Vermont 
Castings cross-examined Wilson on these facts. 
 
After a thirteen-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict 
for Vermont Castings. Although the jury found that the 
stove was defective,2 it found that the defect was not a 
substantial factor in causing Wilson's injuries. 
 
After trial, Wilson's lawyer, Andrew Kessler, spoke to 
Juror #9, Penelope Merrill. Merrill told Kessler that another 
juror owned a Vermont Castings stove. The juror with the 
stove told the other jurors of her personal experience with 
the stove, including that she had to leave the door open to 
start a fire. She told the jurors that the stove came with a 
manual, and that she had read the manual during the trial 
to see if there were any warnings. She also informed them 
of the content of the warnings.3 The other jurors then asked 
this juror whether, knowing what she now knew from the 
trial and from her review of the manual, she would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
stipulation of the parties. For purposes of simplicity, we will refer only 
to 
Vermont Castings when referring to the Defendants. 
 
2. It is not clear from the record which alleged defect(s) the jury found 
existed. 
 
3. There is no evidence in the record as to what these warnings stated. 
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continue to operate the stove with the door open. The juror 
indicated that she would not modify her behavior even if 
there were a warning on the stove. See Appellant's App. at 
176-77 (Kessler Aff.). 
 
Upon learning this information, Wilson filed a motion for 
a new trial. She claimed, inter alia, that (1) the jury's 
verdict was tainted by the information about the stove 
owner's manual, and (2) during Wilson's cross-examination 
and Vermont Castings's closing argument, Vermont 
Castings impermissibly argued that Wilson was negligent in 
operating the stove. The district court denied the motion. It 
found no prejudice from the juror's conduct, and found 
that Vermont Castings's arguments were permissible under 
Pennsylvania strict products liability law. See Wilson v. 
Vermont Castings, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 691, 695, 697-99 
(M.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
Wilson claims the district court erred in not granting her 
motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct 
and alleged improper arguments made by Vermont 
Castings. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial, as well as its investigation of juror 
misconduct, for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1392-93 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A. 
 
Wilson claims she was prejudiced when one juror 
informed the others of the existence and contents of a 
Vermont Castings stove owner's manual and gave her 
opinion as to how it would affect her own behavior. We 
disagree. 
 
We begin with the general rule that a juror may not 
impeach her own verdict. See Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 
F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975); Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). The 
purpose of this rule is to promote finality of verdicts, 
encourage free deliberations among jurors, and maintain 
the integrity of the jury as a judicial decision-making body. 
Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148. 
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A court may inquire into the verdict, however, if 
"extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought 
to the jury's attention or [if] any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Fed. R. Evid. 
606(b). The scope of the court's inquiry under Rule 606(b) 
is limited: the court may inquire only into the existence of 
the extraneous information. Once the existence of 
extraneous information has been established, the court 
may not inquire into the subjective effect of such 
information on the particular jurors. See, e.g., United States 
v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Gereau, 523 F.2d at 149; see also United States v. Jonnet, 
762 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1985) (in assessing effect of 
inadmissible evidence brought into jury room, court may 
not inquire into jury's deliberative process). Instead, the 
court must make an objective assessment of how the 
information would affect the hypothetical average juror. See 
Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993). Even 
where there is evidence of juror misconduct, "the verdict 
will stand unless the party has been prejudiced by the 
misconduct." Gereau, 523 F.2d at 153-54. 
 
In this case, Wilson alleges two types of jury misconduct. 
First, she claims that one juror improperly consulted her 
own Vermont Castings stove owner's manual during the 
trial and reported its contents to the jury. Second, she 
alleges that the same juror advised the other jurors that 
she also found it necessary to leave her own Vermont 
Castings stove's door open, and that she intended to 
continue this practice even if there was a warning, and 
even in light of what she had learned at trial. 
 
With respect to Wilson's first claim, the district court 
determined that the manual constituted "extraneous 
information" but concluded that its consideration did not 
prejudice Wilson. We agree. Because there was no evidence 
in the record that Wilson ever read her stove owner's 
manual, this information was not relevant to causation. 
Thus, the existence of warnings in the juror's manual 
related solely to the issue of defect. Because Wilson 
prevailed on the issue of defect, she was not prejudiced by 
this extraneous information. 
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We also agree with the district court's conclusion that the 
juror's statements regarding her own conduct did not 
warrant a new trial. The district court determined that this 
information was not "extraneous information" and therefore 
Rule 606(b) precluded further inquiry. Her statement was 
an opinion as to the effect of the extraneous information 
(the contents of the manual) on her views.4 If the district 
court had considered her statement, it would have been the 
equivalent of inquiring into the effect of extraneous 
information on a juror, which is prohibited by Rule 606(b). 
Cf. Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(affidavit inadmissible to the extent it recounted how juror's 
disclosure of personal knowledge about relevant facts in 
case affected the thinking and voting of individual jurors or 
the deliberations of the jury as a whole). A court may make 
only an objective assessment of the effect of the extraneous 
information on the hypothetical average juror. See id.; 
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 710. As we have already concluded, the 
extraneous information was relevant only to defect, and 
thus could not have affected an average juror in a way that 
would have prejudiced Wilson. 
 
Because the extraneous information could not have 
prejudiced Wilson, the district court did not err in refusing 
to grant a new trial on this ground.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is important to note that her statement was also influenced by the 
evidence adduced at trial as well as her own experience as an owner of 
a Vermont Castings woodburning stove. In this regard, her statement is 
similar to the permissible instance of a juror bringing her own life 
experience into a jury room, and thus is not a basis for impeaching the 
verdict. See Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) (juror's 
opinion that there were no open businesses in location at issue in case 
not prejudicial; opinion was "part of the fund of ordinary experience that 
jurors may bring to the jury room and may rely upon . . . in the same 
way that another juror may know that Times Square is busy all night or 
that there are doormen along stretches of Park Avenue"); Gereau, 523 
F.2d at 151 (verdict not invalid "merely because the jurors' generalized 
knowledge about the parties, or some other aspect of the case, is an 
ingredient of the decision. . . . [I]t is not necessary that jurors be 
totally 
ignorant about a case." (quotations omitted)). 
 
5. Nor did the court err in refusing to hold a hearing on the claim of 
juror misconduct. A judge's decision to hold a hearing to investigate 
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B. 
 
Wilson next claims that, during her cross-examination, 
Vermont Castings asked questions which implied she 
negligently operated the stove. Wilson also claims that 
Vermont Castings's closing argument implied she was 
negligent. She claims this was a violation of Pennsylvania 
law, which prohibits a defendant from arguing in a strict 
products liability suit that the plaintiff was negligent. See 
Childers v. Power Line Equip. Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 201, 
207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 
Wilson has failed to preserve this claim for appeal 
because Wilson's counsel did not object to Vermont 
Castings's cross-examination of Wilson or its closing 
argument.6 As this Court has previously noted, "a party 
who fails to object to errors at trial waives the right to 
complain about them following trial." Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 
F.3d 601, 629 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Grace v. Mauser- 
Werke GMBH, 700 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 
(objections not raised at trial are waived).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
alleged juror misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995). Because the 
contents of the manual related solely to defect, and because the court 
could not inquire into the subjective effect of the manual on the jury, a 
hearing would have been futile. See id. at 1484. 
 
6. We also note that Wilson did not object to the jury instruction that 
stated that evidence of Wilson's conduct, although not relevant to defect, 
was relevant to causation. Nor did Wilson request her own instruction 
regarding the relevance of her conduct. 
 
7. Before trial, Wilson's counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that Wilson negligently operated the stove. The district court 
denied the motion to the extent it sought to bar Vermont Castings "from 
using evidence of [Wilson's] conduct to argue that her conduct, not the 
alleged defect caused her clothing to catchfire." Appellant's App. at 36 
(order granting in part and denying in part parties' motions in limine). 
The court stated, however, that Vermont Castings would not be 
permitted to characterize Wilson's conduct as negligent or argue that 
Wilson's errors absolved them of liability. See id. Because Wilson 
prevailed on the motion in limine to limit Vermont Castings's arguments, 
her counsel had an obligation to renew his objection once he thought 
Vermont Castings violated this ruling. Cf. Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 
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This Court has recognized an exception to waiver when 
"counsel fail[s] to object to a fundamental and highly 
prejudicial error resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Fleck 
v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Upon reviewing the record, we find no miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, causation is an essential 
element of a strict products liability claim. See Charlton v. 
Toyota Indus. Equip., 714 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998). Although a defendant cannot argue that a plaintiff 
was negligent, see Childers, 681 A.2d at 207, a defendant 
can argue that the plaintiff 's conduct, not the alleged 
defect, was the sole cause of her injuries. See Charlton, 714 
A.2d at 1047; Madonna v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 708 A.2d 
507, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
 
In this case, Wilson's own counsel elicited the evidence 
surrounding Wilson's actions to demonstrate what occurred 
on that day. Vermont Castings merely cross-examined her 
on these events. Nor did Vermont Castings argue that 
Wilson was negligent; rather, it argued that Wilson's 
conduct, not the alleged defect, was the sole cause of the 
accident. Thus, Vermont Castings's questions and 
arguments based on this evidence were consistent with 
Pennsylvania law and did not result in a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
III. 
 
We conclude that the juror's misconduct in this case did 
not prejudice Wilson. We also conclude that Wilson failed to 
preserve for appeal her argument that Vermont Castings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
F.2d 1380, 1384-85 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant preserved issue for 
appeal when motion in limine denied and he failed to object at trial; 
contrasting situation where a defendant prevails on motion in limine and 
fails to object at trial when that ruling is violated) (citing United 
States 
v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1987)); see also Kostelec v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1229 (8th Cir. 1995) (" `An objection 
is required to preserve error when an opponent, or the court itself, [is 
claimed to have] violate[d] a motion in limine that was granted.' ") 
(quoting Roenigk, 810 F.2d at 815). 
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impermissibly accused Wilson of acting negligently. Even if 
she had preserved her argument, we conclude that Vermont 
Castings's arguments were permissible under Pennsylvania 
law. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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